This article analyzes the political language of the Russian Orthodox Church as a social / public instrument of influence. Against the backdrop of post-secular processes, it considers the specifics of the language of political church strategies that go beyond the traditional religious domain. The ways and communicative approaches in the field of government relations and public relations are shown, by which the Russian Orthodox Church establishes relations with the authorities in the post-Soviet period, and already today demonstrates itself not just as one of the institutions of civil society, but also as an institution vested with political functions and political authority. To construct its social and political role, the Church acts situationally. On the one hand, it resorts to narratives of the 20th century, using different discourses -from the "victim" one to isolationism, on the other -to modern concepts typical for post-Soviet times, such as, for example, the idea of messianism, "Katekhon," that is, saving the world from sin. 
ISPS Convention 2017
The popularity of these movements was expressed in particular by the views of Orthodox believers in the political sector, including the request for canonization of Nikolas II, for a monarchy as the most favorable regime.
The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church stipulates in the section "Church and State" that "The Orthodox tradition has developed an explicit ideal of church-state relations," namely "church and state symphony", which "could emerge in history only in a state that recognizes the Orthodox Church as the greatest people's shrine, in other words, only in an Orthodox state." ( § III.4). According to the Social Concept, "The state in such symphonic relationships with the Church seeks her spiritual support, prayer for itself and blessing upon its work to achieve the goal of its It must be borne in mind that at the time of the adoption of the Social Concept, there was no such interest in the archaic as we observe today, and the Church tried to make allowance for that, therefore, at the official level and at the Church senior establishment level it tried to deny any claims to create a political system (On political parties 2001 Federal law N 95-FZ). If they happened to speak about the monarchy as the most favorable political system, they did it without any reference to political realities, but in an abstract manner. But nevertheless, in some disguised manner, the sympathy for the monarchy is still perceivable in the text of the Social Concept of the ROC, although it has its own peculiarities and conditions for the exercise of power: "Any change in the form of government to that more religiously rooted, introduced without spiritualising society itself, will inevitably degenerate into falsehood and hypocrisy and make this form weak and valueless in the eyes of the people. However, one cannot altogether exclude the possibility of such a spiritual revival of society as to make natural a religiously higher form of government. ( § III.7). In particular, Bishop Tikhon of Egorievsk, Chairman of the Patriarchal Cultural Council, also refers to unfavourable circumstances of the present: "The monarchy is the ideal condition, which is natural for Russia. The monarchy is natural to us, but I think it is totally wrong to speak about the renaissance of monarchy now,...one must elevate oneself and live through until the special monarchic consciousness emerges. We are, of course, totally in no condition at this time. Therefore, all the talk about the renaissance of monarchy now seems completely vain... And democracy is what we need in our poverty [25] ."
One should see a certain evolution in the Church's political strategy. During the first 10 years of the 1990s, the Church tries simply to establish more or less constructive contact with power by organizing from time to time the signing of various kinds of treaties and agreements between the Ministry of Health, the Armed Forces, the Social Ministry to get the opportunity of spiritual care and supervision within the framework of the ministerial departments of these ministries.
Orthodox Civilization as a Missionary Project
During the millennium, when a certain period of restoration of church life passed, the church began integrating into basic activity, which was the establishment of church and parish life, the public mission. It began to offer society its paradigms of social and moral life, based on Orthodoxy.
We can see the basic documents that were adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church. were adopted by such a body as the World Russian People's Council, which is both a church and a public body. The chairman and organizer of this cathedral is the current Patriarch, who in 1993, then Metropolitan Kirill, initiated such a public platform on which socially significant and politically significant ideas would be spoken out. During the Council's work, several documents were adopted such as "Code of Moral Management Rules", "Wealth and Poverty: Historical Challenges of Russia", (XI WRPC), "Russia and the West: a dialogue of peoples in search of answers to civilizational challenges" (XX WRPC), "Russia and the Orthodox world" (VIII WRPC).
That is, as we see, the subjects are quite diverse, and it's not so much an internal church as the public agenda. Often it goes beyond the domestic framework. It should be noted that on the foreign policy front, the church placed a special emphasis on In other words, the Church has proposed a civilizational doctrine, using the tools of the Huntingtonian concept of "Clash of Civilizations", according to which several civilizations stand out, most of which being associated with religious cultures at a certain depth level as a kind of matrix that sets ethical-behavioral preferences, attitudes, sociocultural patterns.Huntington singles out Sino, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin American civilizations (ibid). He also mentions the Orthodox civilization, which indicates that Orthodoxy is something more than just a religion, and serves as a basis for a specific socio-cultural way of life.
"VIP-mission". Mechanisms and Features of Church Political Language
To build its social and political mission and realize such a grandiose task as the construc- of enterprises, production workers, and businessmen, with a view of obtainian their administrative or financial support [10] .
As part of this imperative, there is also a system of church awards and orders that are distributed for diplomatic considerations. There is an obvious desire to influence the government apparatus in order to gain its sympathies, and therefore support, to continue pursuing own policy using power, administrative levers.
This phenomenon of gift is described in detail by the American psychologist Robert
Cialdini, who calls it a "reciprocation rule", which is part of socialization and the rule of many cultures. "A small initial favor can produce a sense of obligation to agree to a substantially larger return favor," Cialdini notes and continues:
"The reciprocation rule often makes people obey the demands of others.
The gist of one of the favorite "lucrative" tactics of a certain kind of "compliance professionals" is to give something to a person before asking him for a reciprocal favor. This tactic is very effective due to the three aspects of the reciprocation rule. First, this rule is universal, its influence often exceeds the influence of other factors, which usually determine compliance. Secondly, this rule comes into force even when we are given favors that we did not ask for. Thus, our ability to make independent decisions decreases and the choices are made from us by those to whom we owe something. Finally, the rule of reciprocation can lead to unequal exchange. To get rid of an unpleasant sense of moral obligation, people often agree to do a much more serious favor than the one provided to them. holidays, plunge into the ice-cold water on the Epiphany spread among high-ranking people, the press was full of reports that officials observe fasts, and the Kremlin dining room offered a special fast menu [15] . A certain subculture was formed, which can be designated by the words "pro-church nomenclature" -Orthodox or orthodox-oriented officials and politicians ( [16] , p. 56).
Church as a Political Technologist
The Church, however, is entering into a qualitatively new phase of building a relationship with power aimed at active participation the law-making, showing itself as a political player who knows the methods of the political game, and finally, the Church begins to offer the state itself as a political technologist capable of solving problems both in domestic and foreign policy. In the domestic politics, the Church is increasingly talking about the importance of reliance on traditional conservative values, in one joint commission of representatives of the church and the State Duma, it was even suggested to compile a set of "basic values" on which one could build an ideology of state and society ( [23] ; [16] , p. 53).
As far as foreign policy is concerned, the Church offers here the services of political Thus, the "people from Bolotnaya Square", the opposition was identified with the fascists who attacked the USSR in World War II.
European Liberalism as Heresy. Politics in the Church-dogmatic Categories
Interesting statements are increasingly often made by representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, which deliberately emphasize her messianic, salvific role in the ISPS Convention 2017 world, which is losing its Christian dimension. The main force that Orthodoxy must oppose is the ideology of liberalism, which today dominates the West. The Patriarch not simply characterizes it in eschatological tones as a destructive force that takes man away from God and brings apocalypse closer, but most importantly, calls it "a global heresy of man-worship [12] " That is, the conversation is translated into the plane of ecclesiastical dogma. Accordingly, the Patriarch makes a completely "dogmatic"
conclusion: "we must defend Orthodoxy, as the fathers of the Seventh Ecumenical 
"Sin" as a Factor of Justifying Coercing Institutions
This mechanism refers not so much to the internal positioning of the Church, but rather to the external socio-political discourse inherent in the state in which the Church takes part.
Here are a few quotes from the "Basics of the Social Concept" and explain why we pay attention to it. "As secularization progressed, the high principles of inalienable human rights turned into concepts of the individual's rights outside his connection with There is one more appeal to the notion of "fallen" and "sin" in paragraph XVI.3.: "The Church cannot positively perceive such a global order, in which the human personality obscured by sin is placed in the center of everything."
From these quotes we see that the appeal to sin is very well used in political language. It should be noted that this appeal to sin is not just beautiful theological formulas calling to reflect on high matter about being and human nature, it is political consequences, in particular, that are used as a justification for the coercion machine.
The functioning of the state coercion apparatus is grounded not solely by the need to establish order in society, but by the need to counteract sin.
According to the Basics of the Social Concept, "the answer to the earthly reality distorted by sin, helped to avoid an even greater sin through opposing it by means of secular power." § III.3 of the ROC the Basics of the Social Concept stipulates that «The church should not assume the functions belonging to the state: opposition to sin through violence, the use of worldly powers, the assumption of the functions of state power, involving coercion or restriction." Simultaneously, it is said that "the Church can appeal to state authorities with a request or an appeal to resort to power in certain cases"" ( § III.3). It is interesting, in itself that the function of the state was articulated as "confronting sin through coercion", as well as the fact that the Church can initiate opposition to sin by using a coercive machine, directing the state apparatus in one direction or another. That is, the state retains a function of a kind of "policeman", which will help her maintain a moral and moral lifestyle in society.
The most radical example of practical application of such a stance is the words of Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin he said during a talk show with the eloquent title "Children in Sin", where the priest, then chairman of the Synodal Department of the Russian Orthodox Church for Relations between Church and Society, stated that "morality should be forced on precisely because man is not good as is, his nature is distorted by sin [4] ". The priest stressed that "as such, man will not come to morality," which means "he must be educated, including with harsh methods. Thus, an appeal to sinfulness is used to promote the arms race, which is little correlated with the ethical principles of Orthodoxy, as they reached us before the revolution and before the creation of nuclear weapons [21] . That is, there was literally an inversion. In the very beginning of the 90s, the church environment often cited as performatives the words by St Seraphim of Sarov: "Acquire the spirit of peace and thousands around you will be saved", which contained a frank ecclesiastical message urging a person to pacify, search for conflict resolution and conflict-free existence.
The irony of fate is that same St. Seraphim of Sarov was recognized as a mystical harbinger and defender of nuclear weapons, since the words in the Akathist to St.
Seraphim "you are our shield and defense" were interpreted in a nuclear-strategic way: it was suggested that the word "shield" should mean a "nuclear shield", and not anything else [22] . Orthodox publicist Yegor Kholmogorov and pro-Orthodox nationalist Maxim Kalashnikov have even developed the doctrine of "atomic Orthodoxy", where "Orthodoxy" and "nuclear bomb"" are presented in one bundle, as two conjugated "allies of Russia" [7] -in the pendant formula of Alexander III, who said that Russia has only two allies -the army and navy. There is also a rephrase of this formula, which belongs to Kirill Frolov: "Russia has three allies -the army, the navy and the Church. But the ruins we have here in the center of Kazan, these ruins emerged not because the foreign invaders came to Kazan, but because we destroyed this beauty with our own hands. Now, let's ask the question: How has it come that the Orthodox people, the Muslim believers, have allowed them to destroy temples and mosques in the country?
Because they got them persuaded that if you do this, you'll be happy. And if you have something wrong in your life, this is because an old, anachronistic worldview encumbers you [1] .
That is, by laying the stone, the Patriarch tries to remind of the persecutions the Church endured during the Soviet period. But he implicitly ingrains another thought.
In order to be immune from mistakes similar to which we have witnessed, looking at these ruins, we must promise ourselves to never again be seduced by any insane ideas that require the abandonment of faith, history, and culture." It is not easy now because we all live in a globalizing space (ibid).
That is, appealing to what has been done in the context of the persecution of the twentieth century, the Patriarch does not simply draw a conclusion that there is no need to destroy temples, but that different recipes for social modernization, social and political change must be taken with distrust and rejected given the tragic experience of the collapse of the socio-political system in the Soviet period. The appeal to the victim, which we see in the church discourse, corresponds exactly to the first type: deprivation and humiliation since the persecution of the twentieth century are mentioned not so much to cause compassion for the church as a sacrifice, but for some self-affirmation, justification of rightness, preferential position in the face other social forces that have not undergone such a strong test of strength. The emphasis is placed on heroic overcoming, and this overcoming is articulated with the simultaneous triumphalist message.
"Orthodox
As part of this "heroic" attitude, during the post-Soviet period, the Church gradually realizes its power role, the importance of its own re-rating in the eyes of society and state structures through appeal to power institutions. The Church does not mind gaining respect for herself through the government institutions of coercion (and sometimes not only the government ones).
For example, claiming the right to call on the state to punish the participants of Pussy Riot, one church speaker came up with an argument:
"The church should not bear any grudge at all (reaction to Pussy Riot -note).
But here it is very important that some actions of the Church cannot be taken as a proof that this kind of behavior is ever possible... Many had an impression that it was a test of the fight. About us they say "quilted jackets", "non-passionate people"; "And who are the Orthodox? They are grannies, they are not be reckoned with."… Until recently, such a stance was very common -they say, the Orthodox are not a very important factor, everyone will tolerate... And suddenly such a reaction! [11] " ISPS Convention 2017 "Therefore, I assure you, there was no malice in our hearts, but to do so (to forgive Pussy Riot -ed.) -meant to make a significant mistake, to convey a wrong message to our society, our people. We could not go this far. (ibid)"
Conclusion
Our reflections can be summarized by that the political language of the Church is an abundant area for research, an interesting phenomenon from the culturological point of view. Here, the contradictory paradoxes of the presence of religion in politics, as well as the post-secular processes as a whole are clearly revealed.
The gospel, the principles of asceticism are the values that overbear politics in the ecclesiastical consciousness, however, the imperative of influencing society urges us to develop in one way or another the political mechanisms for incorporating these values into the society, which often leads to their distortion and, of course, the departure from the gospel simplicity. The more Orthodoxy in Russia is institutionalized, the more developed and complex the political language of the Church becomes. The Church demonstrates itself as an independent and substantial political force. In addition, it is clear that it seeks to include in the arsenal of its appeals to society different patterns, belief patterns, apologetic discourses that pay due regard to the tragic experience of the twentieth century. It applies the tools used by various political forces to overcome discriminatory situations, to raise authority or simply to exit from an underreported position in the social system. It is also obvious that the Church enjoys the legal rhetoric of the institution protecting human rights, developed in the West, but at the same time it fundamentally discards the Western values as they are, trying to direct these institutions to defend their own mindset, their traditionalist principles and even to oppose the West itself.
That is, we see the endorsement of the phenomenon, which Ronald Dor described as "the second indigenization." This is the stage of indigenization, when after a certain initial revival of the national culture and, including the religion traditional for this culture, the driving forces of this national cultural revival begin the process of encapsulation and isolation from Western values. Continuing to use the technical, social and economic tools developed in the West, the agents of national revitalization and revivalism initiate the process of isolation from the West, labelling Western liberalism and ideology with the term of "westoxification". We see, one way or another, that as long as the ecclesial life in the post-Soviet period was restored, the political language of the Church evolved from a certain stigmatization to the triumphalist discourse aimed not so much at protecting the institution of the Church as at reinforcing its influence on society. Accordingly, the usual liberal human rights mechanisms are being replaced by new ones aimed not to "protect" the Church as a minority, but to assert the Church's ideological principles at the level of the country and society.
